Negotiation is a very common interaction between automated agents. Many common negotiation protocols work with cardinal utilities, even though ordinal preferences, which only rank the outcomes, are easier to elicit from humans. In this work we concentrate on negotiation with ordinal preferences over a finite set of outcomes. We study an intuitive protocol for bilateral negotiation, where the two parties make offers alternately. We analyze the negotiation protocol under different settings. First, we assume that each party has full information about the other party's preference order. We provide elegant strategies that specify a subgame perfect equilibrium for the agents. We further show how the studied negotiation protocol almost completely implements a known bargaining rule. Finally, we analyze the no information setting. We study several solution concepts that are distribution-free, and analyze both the case where neither party knows the preference order of the other party, and the case where only one party is uninformed.
Introduction
Negotiation is a dialogue between two or more parties over one or more issues, where each party has some preferences regarding the discussed issues, and the negotiation process aims to reach an agreement that would be beneficial to the parties. The basic automated negotiation protocol, which consists of two parties that alternate offers, was introduced by Rubinstein [19] . Since then a lot of work has been done to develop other types of protocols, and to extend the basic bilateral negotiation protocol [10] .
Many common negotiation protocols work with cardinal utilities, i.e., with utility functions that give different outcomes a specific numerical value, according to the agents' preferences. This representation requires the agents to specify the magnitude of how much they prefer one outcome over another. However, this specification is not always readily available. Moreover, in many cases the agents need to act on behalf of humans, and the use of cardinal utilities for representing human preferences has been widely criticized on the grounds of cognitive complexity, difficulty of elicitation, and other factors (e.g., [2] ). On the other hand, ordinal preferences only rank the outcomes, so they reduce cognitive burden and are easier to elicit.
Indeed, there are some negotiation protocols that work with ordinal preferences. However, these protocols only start with the ordinal preferences, and they then convert them to a cardinal utility according to some assumptions [16, 20] . Moreover, the traditional assumption in the negotiation theory is that there is a continuum of feasible outcomes. However, many real-life situations involve a finite number of outcomes, such as two managers choosing from among a few job candidates, or a couple choosing from among a few apartments. Even in negotiation over monetary payoffs, the number of outcomes is bounded by the indivisibility of the smallest monetary unit.
In this paper we study negotiation with ordinal preferences over a finite set of outcomes, without converting the ordinal preferences to a cardinal utility 1 . We analyze an intuitive protocol for bilateral negotiation that was introduced by Anbarci [3] , where the two parties make alternating offers. Each offer is a possible outcome, and we allow the parties to make any offer they would like, in any order. The only restriction is that no offer can be made twice, thus if there are m possible outcomes the negotiation will last at most m rounds.
We analyze the negotiation protocol in different settings. First, we assume that each party has full information about the other party's preference order, and she will thus take this into account and act strategically when deciding what to offer. We provide elegant strategies that specify a Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) for the parties. Specifically, our strategies are easy to implement, and we improve the previous result of [4] and find a SPE strategy in linear time instead of quadratic time.
We note that there are several works that studied bargaining rules with ordinal preferences over a finite set of outcomes, but they are inherently different from non-cooperative negotiation protocols. A bargaining rule is a function that assigns to each negotiation instance a subset of the outcomes, which are considered the result of the negotiation. These rules are useful only in a cooperative environment, or where there is a central authority that can force the parties to offer specific outcomes in a specific order.
The proof that our proposed strategies specify a SPE provides us with a deep understanding of the negotiation protocol, which enables us to establish a connection to the results of the designed Rational Compromise (RC) bargaining rule [12] . Surprisingly, the SPE result of the negotiation protocol is always part of the set of results returned by the RC rule, even though the protocol does not force the parties to offer specific outcomes in a specific order as the RC rule does. This connection also enables us to prove that the SPE result of the protocol is monotonic.
We then move on to analyze the no information setting. We analyze the case where neither party knows the preference order of the other party nor do they know prior probability distribution over possible orders. In this setting we first show that an ex-post SPE does not exist. We then provide the maxmin strategy and the maxmin value of the game that is imposed by our protocol. We also show that in our setting, surprisingly, any pair of maxmin strategies also specifies a robust-optimization equilibrium. Finally, we consider the case where one party has full information while the other party has no information, and show how the informed party is able to use her information so that the negotiation result will be better for her.
The contribution of this work is threefold. First, we introduce elegant strategies that specify a SPE, and provide a substantial analysis for showing that they indeed form a SPE. We also provide an improved algorithm for computing a SPE strategy for the studied negotiation protocol. The second contribution of our work is that we show how the studied negotiation protocol almost completely implements the RC rule. As noted by Kıbrıs and Sertel [12] , who studied the RC rule, the descriptive relevance of the RC rule for real-life bargaining depends on the existence of non-cooperative games that implement it, and to the best of our knowledge our paper is the first to find such a connection. Finally, we provide an analysis of the negotiation protocol under a no information setting, which has not been considered before.
Related Work
Negotiation protocols and the strategic interaction they imply have been extensively studied. We refer to the books of [18] , [13] , and [10] for extensive coverage of the different approaches. The traditional assumption in negotiation theory is that there is a continuum of feasible outcomes, but many real-life negotiation scenarios violate these assumptions. Indeed, there are several works that consider problems with a finite number of outcomes. For example, see [24] , [14] , [15] and recently [17] . All of these works focus on negotiation when the preferences are represented by a cardinal utility, while we study negotiation with ordinal preferences.
Many other works study negotiation with ordinal preferences over a finite set of outcomes (for example, [23] ). Sequential procedures, in particular the fallback bargaining method, have attracted considerable interest [21, 11, 6, 12, 8] , since they satisfy some nice theoretical properties. All of these works study bargaining rules that are useful in a cooperative environment. We study a negotiation protocol that is useful in a non-cooperative environment, and show that its SPE almost completely implements the individually rational variant of the fallback bargaining method, i.e., the RC rule [12] . We note that the RC bargaining rule is equivalent to Bucklin voting with two voters, and thus our result can also be interpreted as a (weak) SPE implementation of the Bucklin rule where there are two voters.
There are few works that study negotiation protocols with ordinal preferences over a finite set of outcomes. De Clippel et al. [9] study the problem of selection of arbitrators, and they concentrate on two-step protocols. The most closely related works are Anbarci's papers. In [3] he introduces the Voting by Alternating Offers and Vetoes (VAOV) negotiation protocol, which we study here, and shows the possible SPE results in different scenarios. Implicitly, this work shows that the SPE result is unique and Pareto optimal. In [4] he introduces three additional negotiation protocols. Moreover, he sharpens his previous result by exactly identifying the SPE result of the VAOV protocol, and by providing an algorithm that computes a SPE strategy. He also shows that if the outcomes are distributed uniformly over the comprehensive utility possibility set and as the number of outcomes tends to infinity the VAOV protocol converges to the equal area rule [22] . We provide a more efficient algorithm that finds an elegant SPE strategy. In addition, we were able to establish the relationship between the VAOV protocol and the RC rule, which works with a finite number of outcomes, and we also analyze the no information setting.
The Negotiation Protocol
We assume that there are two negotiation parties, p 1 and p 2 , negotiating over a set of potential outcomes O = {o 1 , ..., o m }, where p 1 is the party that makes the first offer. Each party has a preference order over the potential outcomes that does not permit any ties. Formally, the preferences of a party p are a strict order, ≻ p , which is a complete, transitive and irreflexive binary relation on O. We write o ′ ≻ p o to denote that party p strictly prefers o ′ to o, and o
is the exact same outcome as o). Clearly, each party would like to maximize her utility, i.e., that the result of the negotiation will be the outcome that is placed as high as possible according to her preferences.
We analyze the following negotiation protocol, which is the VAOV protocol of [3] . The parties make offers alternately. No offer can be made twice, but an agreement must be reached since we assume that any agreement is preferred by both parties over a no-agreement result. We also assume that lotteries are not valid offers, as in most real-life negotiations. Formally, denote by O t the set of available outcomes at round t, and the let O 1 = O. 
We show that in each round t we can identify a set of outcomes that cannot be the negotiation result if the parties are rational, regardless of the information they have. Intuitively, these are all the outcomes that are in the lower parts of the preference orders of both parties, denoted by Low t . We denote all of the other outcomes by JG t . Proof. Starting from round t where |O t | = m t , each party will be able to reject all of the offers that she would receive from the other party, except for the offer she would receive in the last round. Specifically, if m t is odd, p i and p j can reject at most ⌊m t /2⌋ offers. If m t is even, p i can reject at most ⌊m t /2⌋ − 1 offers (since it is p i 's turn to offer) and p j can reject at most ⌊m t /2⌋ offers. That is, each party p k , k ∈ {1, 2}, can reject at most |L k t | offers. Therefore, each party will always be able to guarantee that the result of the negotiation will be an outcome that is placed higher than the |L k t | lowest outcomes in her preference order. Therefore, o / ∈ Low t .
Definition 2. Given a round t, let Low
We now analyze the negotiation protocol under two different models of information: full information and no information. In each case we are interested in finding the best actions that a party should take, given the information that she has.
Full Information
In this setting we assume that each party has full information about the other party's preference order, and she will thus take this information into account when calculating her best strategy. Therefore, in the full information setting we are interested in finding a SPE. Since [3] showed that the SPE result is unique, it suffices to find one set of strategies that specify a SPE.
Recall that SPE is a mapping that maps the histories of players' choices. Note that in our case if an offer was accepted the game is over. Therefore, a history for p i , the party whose turn it is to make an offer at a given round, consists of a sequence of outcomes that were proposed and rejected in the previous rounds. Let
.., o t−1 ) be the history for p i at round t, and note
t be the least preferred outcome in O t according to ≻ p j . We show that the following strategy specifies the offering strategy in our SPE.
Strategy 1 (Offering Strategy). Given a history H
A history for p j , the party whose turn it is to decide whether to accept or reject an offer at a given round, consists of a sequence of outcomes that were proposed and rejected in the previous rounds and an additional outcome o that was offered by p i in the current round. Let
In addition, given a round t and history for
Given a round t and history for
is the result of the negotiation if both parties reject all of the offers that they get (except for the last offer) from round t and on, but use the offering strategy that is specified by Strategy 1 from round t + 1 and on. We show that the following strategy specifies the response strategy in our SPE.
Strategy 2 (Response Strategy). Given a history H
To illustrate the strategies of our SPE, consider the following examples: In each subsequent round the parties would offer each other the least preferred outcomes, until the final round where o 6 will be accepted as the result of the negotiation.
In order to prove that our strategies specify a SPE, we need a deeper understating of the offering and response strategies. We note that in the offering strategy (Strategy 1), p i offers an outcome from the set I t if it is not empty. We now show the relation between the set I t and the set JG t .
Proof. Suppose that in round t, |O t | = m t is odd. Then
Now suppose that m t is even. Then
Considering Lemma 1, we show a simple corollary. Let o eq be the SPE result. We get:
If we combine the findings from Corollary 1 and Lemma 2, we get that if the set I t is empty, i.e., the intersection between the lower parts of the preference orders of the parties is empty, then the set JG t contains only one outcome, o eq .
Proof. From Lemma 2, |JG t | = 1. Assume that o eq / ∈ JG t , then o eq ∈ Low t , in contradiction to Lemma 1.
Next, we show how the transition from round t to round t + 1 affects the number of outcomes in L k t+1 , k ∈ {1, 2}. After that p i offered the outcome o and p j rejected it, m t+1 is odd, and the roles are switched between p i and p j . Therefore, 
We note that the number of outcomes in L k t is important, since we already showed in Corollary 1 that these are the outcomes that cannot be an equilibrium result. Indeed, it is more important to understand how the transition from round t to round t + 1 affects which outcomes become part of L 
Lemma 5. In round t, if
Proof. According to Lemma 3, the set L i t+1 contains one outcome less than the set L j t . Therefore, if p i offers o ∈ L j t and p j rejects it, o is the only outcome that becomes unavailable in round t + 1, and we can thus be assured that
Proof. According to lemma 3, the sets L Note that when p j follows Strategy 2 she computes the outcome o a (H j t ) to decide whether to accept or reject the offer that she gets from p i . By definition,
We 
We also define the number of offers that are made before reaching a round t ′ where I t ′ = ∅. We also make the following simple observation, which is true since we use an alternating offers protocol: Lemma 9. At any round t, ℓ j,t ≤ ℓ i,t .
Our main theorem is as follows:
Theorem 10. Strategies 1 and 2 specify a SPE.
Proof. We prove by induction on m. If m = 2 and t = 1, WLOG assume that 
Suppose that both parties follow strategies 1 and 2, and let t ′ be the round in which JG t ′ = {o at }. Then, in round t, ℓ i,t < d i,at,t and ℓ j,t < d j,at,t (otherwise, o at / ∈ JG t ′ ). By definition, t ′ = ℓ i,t + ℓ j,t . In addition, since JG t ′ = {o at }, o x must be part of Low t ′′ for some t ′′ < t ′ (otherwise, o x ∈ JG t ′ ). Since o x ≻ p i o at and ℓ i,t < d i,at,t , it must be that o x is part of L j t ′′ , that is, d j,x,t ≤ ℓ j,t . In summary:
Now assume that in round t p i deviates, and the result of the negotiation, if both parties follow our strategies from round t + 1, is o x . Note that p i in round t + 1 is p j in round t, and thus o at ≻ p i o x . Therefore, we use the same arguments as above to get . If we combine these 3 equations with equations 2 we get that ℓ j,t+1 < d j,x,t < d j,at,t and d i,at,t + c ≤ ℓ i,t+1 . Adding equations 1 we get that ℓ i,t < ℓ i,t+1 − c and ℓ i,t+1 < ℓ j,t . Adding Lemma 9 we can conclude that ℓ i,t+1 < ℓ j,t ≤ ℓ i,t < ℓ i,t+1 − c. That is, ℓ i,t+1 ≤ ℓ i,t+1 − c − 2, thus c ≤ −2. However, the distance function cannot decrease by more than 1 when moving from round t to t + 1, thus c ≥ −1.
We . If we combine these 3 equations with equations 2 we get that ℓ i,t+1 < d j,x,t + 1 < d j,at,t and d i,at,t + c ≤ ℓ j,t+1 . Adding equation 1 we get that ℓ i,t < ℓ j,t+1 − c and ℓ i,t+1 − 1 < ℓ j,t . Adding Lemma 9 we can conclude that ℓ i,t+1 − 1 < ℓ j,t ≤ ℓ i,t < ℓ j,t+1 − c. That is, ℓ j,t+1 − 1 ≤ ℓ j,t+1 − c − 2, thus c ≤ −1. However, in order for d i,at,t to decrease by at least one,
Overall, we showed that p i does not have an incentive to deviate in round t. According to the induction assumption, Strategies 1 and 2 specify a SPE when there are m − 1 outcomes in round t + 1. Therefore, p i does not have any incentive to deviate.
Finally, note that trivial exploration of the whole game tree in order to derive the SPE would take at least O(2 m ) operations, since there can be m − 1 rounds in which a party p i can offer any outcome from the available outcomes and the other party p j can decide either to accept the offer or reject it. The complexity of finding a SPE strategy of [4] is not explicitly analyzed, but its running time is at least O(m 2 ). Our approach provides elegant strategies that are easy to implement and are (computationally) more efficient: given a state in the game tree (i.e. given any history H i t or H j t ), we compute a SPE strategy from the current state in time that is linear in m. Indeed, in our approach we only need to simulate one branch of the tree (to find o a (H 
Properties
We first note that since we showed that the result of following Strategies 1 and 2 is Pareto optimal, we proved that they specify a SPE, and the SPE result is unique, we can infer that the SPE result of the protocol is Pareto optimal. We now move to analyze the relationship between the SPE result of the protocol and the results of the designed Rational Compromise (RC) bargaining rule [12] . The RC rule is a private case of the Unanimity Compromise rule, where any agreement is preferred by both parties over a no-agreement result, as we assume. With our notations, the RC rule can be rephrased as the set RC = {o x | max ox∈O min k∈{1,2} (d k,x,1 + |L k 1 | − 1)}. It can also be computed by the following steps: We note that the RC rule may return either one or two outcomes, while our protocol always results with a single outcome. Surprisingly, the SPE result of the negotiation protocol is always part of the set returned by the RC rule. The intuition is that our strategies specify a SPE by making offers and rejecting them until I t = ∅. At this stage JG t = {o eq }, and by definition the set JG t is the intersection of the upper parts of the preferences of both parties, which corresponds to the B Proof. Let t be the round where I t = ∅ after both parties follow our strategies. By Corollary 2, JG t = {o eq }. Rephrasing the definition of JG t we get that
That is, RC = {o eq }. 
Finally, we adapt the monotonicity criterion that the RC rule satisfies for our domain, and show that the negotiation protocol is monotonic. 
Definition 5. A negotiation protocol is monotonic if given an instance
, we get that o ′ eq ≻ o eq for both parties, as required.
No Information
We now consider the case of no information, where we assume that neither party knows the preference order of the other party. Moreover, the parties do not even hold any prior probability distribution over each other's possible preference orders. A common solution concept for this case is an ex-post equilibrium, or in our case, an ex-post SPE. Intuitively, this is a strategy profile in which the strategy of each party depends only on her own type, i.e., its preference order, and it is a SPE for every realization of the other party's type (i.e. her private preference order). Formally, let s k (≺) be a strategy for player k ∈ {1, 2} given a preference order ≺, and let F ([s 1 (≺), s 2 (≺ ′ )]) be the negotiation result if both parties follow their strategies. In the ex-post setting, a strategy for party k ∈ {1, 2}, s k , is a best response to s 3−k if for every strategy s ′ k and for every preference orders ≺,
. A strategy profile [s 1 , s 2 ] is an ex-post equilibrium if s 1 is a best response to s 2 and s 2 is a best response to s 1 , and it is an ex-post SPE if it is an ex-post equilibrium in every subgame of the game. We show that ex-post equilibrium, and thus also ex-post SPE, are too strong to exist in our setting. Theorem 14. There are no two strategies that specify an ex-post equilibrium for our protocol.
Proof. Clearly, every ex-post SPE is also a SPE (i.e., in the full information setting), and we can thus use our previous results that characterize the SPE. Assume by contradiction that there are two strategies s 1 , s 2 for parties p 1 , p 2 , respectively, such that [s 1 , s 2 ] is an ex-post SPE. Let
Following our strategies we get that the SPE result is o 4 . Since the SPE result is unique and every ex-post SPE is also a SPE,
and thus s 1 is not a best response to s 2 .
We note that Theorem 14 also implies that there is no solution in dominant strategies. Another approach to uncertainty, which follows a conservative attitude, is that a party p k , k ∈ {1, 2}, who wants to maximize her utility may want to play a maxmin strategy. That is, since the preference order and the strategy of the other party p 3−k are not known, it is sensible to assume that p 3−k happens to play a strategy that causes the greatest harm to p k , and to act accordingly. p k then guarantees the maxmin value of the game for her, which in our case is a set of outcomes such that no other outcome that is ranked lower than all of the outcomes in this set will be accepted as the result of the negotiation, regardless of the preferences of p 3−k . Before we show the maxmin strategy we define the complement sets for the sets L k t , i.e., the sets of highest ranked outcomes.
Definition 6. In each round t, for each party
The maxmin strategy, which is composed of offering and response strategies, is defined as follows:
We now prove that our strategy specifies a maxmin strategy, and that a party p k that follows it can guarantee the maxmin value of the game, which is the set U k 1 . We denote the party that uses Strategy 3 by p max and the other party, which might try to minimize the utility of p max , by p min . Note that we need to handle both the case where p max starts the negotiation (i.e, p max = p 1 ) and the case where p min starts it (i.e., p min = p 1 ). We re-use Lemmas 4, 5 and 6, since they do not depend on the full-information assumption. Furthermore, we add a fourth lemma, which complements these three lemmas by considering the fourth possible offer type.
Proof. According to Lemma 3, the set L t . The idea of the maxmin strategy is that a party, not knowing the preferences of the other party, makes a worst case assumption about the behavior of that party (i.e., that she does not need to be rational). This assumption may seem too restrictive, and we therefore also consider the robust-optimization equilibrium solution concept from [1] , which we adapt to out setting. Intuitively, in this solution concept each party makes a worst case assumption about the preference order of the other party, but each party still assumes that the other party will play rationally and thus her aim is to maximize her utility. Formally, given a strategy profile [s 1 , s 2 ] and a preference order ≺, let w s1,≺,s2
In the robust-optimization setting, a strategy for party k ∈ {1, 2}, s k , is a best response to s 3−k if for all s ′ k and for all ≺, w s k ,≺,s 3−k p k w s ′ k ,≺,s 3−k . A strategy profile [s 1 , s 2 ] is a robust-optimization equilibrium if s 1 is a best response to s 2 and s 2 is a best response to s 1 . We show that in our setting, surprisingly, every pair of maxmin strategies specifies a robust-optimization equilibrium. That is, the worst negotiation result for p k is the least preferred outcome in U , in contradiction to Theorem 16.
Finally, consider an asymmetric information setting, where there exists one party that has full information about the other party's preference order, while the other party does not have this information. Let p inf o be the party that has the full information, and p null be the other party. p null has no information and she will thus act according to the maxmin strategy (Strategy 3). p inf o would like to take advantage of her knowledge, so the negotiation result will be better for her. However, according to Theorem 16, the maxmin value of the game is U null 1 . Therefore, the best strategy for p inf o is as follows. If p inf o starts the negotiation, she should offer the best outcome from U null 1 according to her preferences, and p null will accept it. If p inf o starts the negotiation, she will offer an outcome from U null 1
. If this is the best outcome according to p inf o 's preferences, she should accept it. Otherwise, in the second round p inf o should offer the best outcome from U null 1 according to her preferences, and p null will accept it.
Conclusion
We investigated the VAOV negotiation protocol, which is suitable for ordinal preferences over a finite set of outcomes. We introduced strategies that specify a SPE, and improved upon previous results by providing a linear time algorithm that computes a SPE strategy. We provided substantial analysis of our strategies, which showed the equivalence of the SPE result of the protocol in a non-cooperative setting, to the result of the RC rule in a cooperative setting. Finally, we analyzed the no information setting. We believe that our approach is especially suitable for non-cooperative, multi-agent systems, since we provide easy to implement strategies that can be computed only once if both agents follow the SPE strategy on the equilibrium path. Moreover, there is no need for a central authority to guarantee that the negotiation result will be Pareto optimal, if both agents are rational and follow the SPE strategy. For future work, we would like to extend the protocol to a multi-party setting and analyze the resulting SPE. In addition, it is important to find additional implementation of other bargaining rules by negotiation protocols, similar to the implementation that we showed for the RC rule by the SPE of the VAOV protocol.
